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Nerve Agent Incidents and Public Health Preparedness
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Recent use of nerve agents (NAs) by terrorists and assassins exposes the need for public 
health responders and medical preparedness personnel to work together (1). Health care 
providers might find themselves at the scene of such an attack. Would the involvement of an 
NA be recognized? What should be done immediately to assess the situation, treat the 
victims, protect others and oneself, and alert appropriate health officials? These are essential 
questions a health care provider in the vicinity of an attack might face. We provide an 
overview of key clinical and public health concerns related to this topic for health care 
practitioners and public health officials.
Recognizing NA Exposure
Nerve agents are among the most lethal agents of chemical warfare. Their development, 
production, acquisition, stockpiling, and retention are prohibited by the 1997 Chemical 
Weapons Convention, which was signed by 192 nations, including the United States (2). 
Nerve agents are organophosphorus compounds and are in a similar chemical class to some 
insecticides. They inhibit the enzyme acetylcholinesterase, which normally inactivates the 
neurotransmitter acetylcholine at neuronal junctions. Exposure to NAs results in enhanced 
and prolonged stimulation of muscarinic and nicotinic cholinergic receptors in the peripheral 
and central nervous systems (3). Health care providers may be challenged to differentiate 
NA-associated illness from opioid poisoning because of similar clinical effects (Table). A 
key distinction is the cholinergic signs and symptoms that are seen after exposure to NAs 
and generally absent in opioid poisoning. A mnemonic for some of these signs and 
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symptoms is “SLUDGE:” salivation, lacrimation, urination, diarrhea, gastrointestinal 
cramps, and emesis. Prominent bradycardia, broncho-spasm, bronchorrhea, weakness, and 
fasciculations may be evident and depend on such variables as dose, exposure route, and 
clinical course (5). Treatment of NA poisoning includes the following medical 
countermeasures: atropine (blocks acetylcholine receptors from excessive stimulation), 
pralidoxime (prevents acetylcholinesterase deactivation by NA), and benzodiazepine 
(controls seizures or severe fasciculations) (6).
Sarin, cyclosarin, soman, tabun, and VX are the most well-known NAs. They are classified 
on the basis of their volatility, defined as the tendency to evaporate at room temperature. 
Sarin, cyclosarin, soman, and tabun are high-volatility NAs, whereas VX is a low-volatility 
NA. Breathing in vapors of a high-volatility NA may result in rapid onset of symptoms. 
Low-volatility NA poisoning is more likely to occur from dermal absorption, which can 
result in delayed onset of signs and symptoms. Low-volatility NAs are more persistent in the 
environment and may pose a greater risk for secondary contamination, which would place 
health care providers who respond to these incidents without appropriate personal protective 
equipment at significant risk. If NA release is suspected, first responders should use such 
equipment and exposed patients should be decontaminated.
Rapid Notification of Public Health Officials
Health care providers should notify public health officials early to mobilize emergency 
medical and public health resources. A comprehensive online resource is Chemical Hazards 
Emergency Medical Management (CHEMM, https://chemm.nlm.nih.gov). It provides 
information that may aid recognition of an NA exposure and how to alert appropriate 
authorities, protect oneself and others, and decide what onsite actions are and are not safe. 
Other resources available by telephone to responders and clinicians include their local 
hazardous material (HazMat) response team, their regional poison control center 
(1-800-222-1222), and emergency services (911).
The Laboratory Response Network and Strategic National Stockpile
Rapid laboratory analysis capacity is needed during response to incidents involving NAs. In 
1999, the Laboratory Response Network was established in the United States as a 
collaboration among the Association of Public Health Laboratories, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to improve the 
capabilities, turnaround time, and capacity of U.S. public health laboratories. The part of the 
network responsible for chemical threats (LRN-C) consists of 54 laboratories that are run by 
states, territories, and large cities and receive technical and funding support from the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention. The capabilities of the LRN-C include emergent testing 
of clinical samples for specific chemical agents of concern. It aims to promptly report 
accurate laboratory results on a limited number of clinical samples to support the response to 
a public health incident. In light of the surge and escalation of laboratory capacity during 
such incidents, another goal is to support response activities by analyzing, interpreting, and 
reporting results from the initial few clinical samples and from thousands of later samples 
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(7). The LRN-C is engaged by contacting the public health laboratory of each state health 
department.
During an NA mass casualty incident, prompt access to sufficient quantities of medical 
countermeasures (for example, antidotes) will be a public health challenge. Community 
hospitals may not stock the amount of medical countermeasures needed because of the 
relative rarity of these incidents. To address this gap, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s Strategic National Stockpile established the CHEMPACK program in 2002. 
The program places containers of atropine, pralidoxime chloride, and diazepam 
(autoinjectors and vials) at locations of the state’s choosing, mostly within hospitals, fire 
departments, and emergency medical services for urgent mobilization. These medical 
countermeasures are federally owned but locally managed, are integrated into community 
response plans, and can be immediately used in an emergency without federal permission. 
Access to CHEMPACK contents is through local response mechanisms that vary by 
jurisdiction. Some may include requests through or consultation with poison centers, and 
others may involve activation of HazMat teams, fire departments, or other community or 
hospital response plans (8). Health care providers may benefit from becoming familiar with 
their local response plan.
Remaining Challenges
Although these advancements have improved community preparedness for chemical 
incidents, many challenges remain. Because health care facilities play a prominent role in 
community preparedness, persistent challenges include inaccurate risk perception (“It will 
not happen here”), high financial cost versus benefit (no perceived economic return on 
investment for preparedness activities), and unrealistic planning assumptions (“prompt and 
comprehensive community assistance is immediately available”). Solutions to these 
challenges may include increased research on factors that promote successful, long-term 
strategies for hospital preparedness; economic and noneconomic incentives for effective 
preparedness actions; and a more targeted approach to developing federal guidance, 
preparedness metrics, and supportive federal funding opportunities (9). Clinicians, poison 
center employees, hospital preparedness personnel, emergency managers, and public health 
department members will need to increase coordination, collaboration, and communication 
to share resources, lessons learned, and best practices.
Recent international events remind us that NAs can be used to attack individuals and pose a 
public health threat (10). Health care providers may benefit from learning about the local 
mechanisms for public health response and the resources already in place; more important, 
from putting them into practice in coordinated simulations, drills, and exercises.
From National Center for Environmental Health, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia (A.C., J.T., R.J., J.S., L.Y.); and Office of Public Health 
Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia 
(S.E.G.).
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